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Abstract
This Independent Study investigates the effect of political party on Congressional roll-call
votes on public lands policies and how this effect changes over time. Many scholars have
documented the role that political party plays in influencing roll-call voting behavior, but
this study fills a gap with regards to public lands policy specifically. I argue that, over time,
political party has become more predictive of whether or not a member of Congress will
vote in favor of public lands policies. The results of my study show that, beginning around
the 1990s, Senators began to divide along party lines on public lands policies. Democratic
Senators voted increasingly in favor of public lands policies, while their Republican
counterparts became less likely to support these policies over time. Today, the two parties
are nearly entirely polarized on the issue. However, there are Republicans today who vote
against their party and in favor of public lands policies. I argue that, for these outlying
Senators, constituency is a driving force behind their decisions. When talking publicly
about public lands, I found that Republican Senators with high vote scores frequently make
appeals to their constituency by referencing the lands in their state.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
In 2009, producers Ken Burns and Dayton Duncan released their documentary “The
National Parks: America’s Best Idea.” This six episode series covered national parks across
the nation, from Yosemite National Park in California to Acadia National Park in Maine,
exploring some of the world’s most incredible natural, cultural, and historical places. The
documentary, however, is about more than the land itself; it is at its heart a “story of people:
people from every conceivable background – rich and poor; famous and unknown; soldiers
and scientists; natives and newcomers; idealists, artists and entrepreneurs; people who were
willing to devote themselves to saving some precious portion of the land they loved, and
in doing so reminded their fellow citizens of the full meaning of democracy” (“The
National Parks”). People have been integral in shaping the stories of national parks, state
parks, and other public lands across the country. Public lands are called public for a reason:
they are lands set aside for exploration, recreation, and appreciation by every American
citizen. They belong to all of us.
Calling national parks “America’s Best Idea” is a bold claim, but it is well deserved.
Public lands are overwhelmingly popular amongst the American public, and in an
increasingly polarized climate, they are one of the few areas which offer common ground
between people of all backgrounds and beliefs. Whether or not a person has actually had
the opportunity to visit these lands, there is a nearly universal sense that protecting them
for others and for the future is important. However, in those elected to represent the
American people, our members of Congress, this universality is missing. In recent years,
significant opposition in Congress can be seen with regards to bills that would establish,
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fund, repair, and otherwise support national parks and public lands. Congressional
disagreement is not an uncommon phenomenon, with intense conflict today on issues
ranging from healthcare to immigration policy. It is important to note, however, that on
these various other issues disagreement is also common amongst the American people. In
the case of public lands, on the other hand, Congressional opposition does not reflect the
widespread support of the constituency. This raises the question, why do members of
Congress disagree on public lands policy despite widespread public support? When did
considerable opposition to public lands policy in Congress begin, and how has it evolved
over time? In an attempt to answer these questions, I look to the literature on public lands
governance and on the roll-call voting behavior of members of Congress.
Based on the literature concerning the primary explanations of roll-call voting
behavior, I developed two main hypotheses. Political party has been shown to have an
effect on the roll-call vote choice of members of Congress, increasingly so as polarization
has occurred between the Democratic and Republican parties (Ansolabehere et al. 2001,
Theriault 2008, Sinclair 2006). Therefore, I hypothesize that over time, partisan
identification has become more predictive as to whether or not a member of Congress will
vote for or against public lands policy. Furthermore, personal ideology and constituency
have also been shown to have strong effects on roll-call vote choice. My second hypothesis
maintains that among Republican members of Congress today, votes in favor of public
lands policies can be explained by constituent support for public lands or a personal
connection to public lands. I rely on quantitative analysis of roll-call votes to test my first
hypothesis and hand-coded content analysis to test my second. By testing these hypotheses
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and attempting to answer my research question, I offer further insight into how members
of Congress vote on and talk publicly about public lands policy.
In the chapters that follow, I examine my hypotheses and their implications.
Chapter 2 offers an overview of the relevant literature regarding both the history and the
governance of public lands in the United States. This chapter also considers the most
prominent areas of literature regarding explanations for Congressional roll-call voting
behavior. I end the chapter by theorizing as to how these explanations of roll-call voting
may be able to explain roll-call voting behavior on public lands policy, specifically.
Chapter 3 establishes my formal research question and my hypotheses and details the
methodology employed to test these hypotheses. Chapter 4 provides a statistical analysis
and a content analysis as well as the details of my results and whether or not my results
support my hypotheses. I end in Chapter 5 with the conclusions of my study, alongside
implications for policy as well as recommendations for areas of further research.
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Chapter 2: Review of the Literature and Theory
Introduction
In this chapter, I give a background on relevant literature pertaining to public lands
policy and roll-call voting. Throughout more than two centuries of public land management
in the United States, a wealth of literature has formed surrounding the entities in charge of
public lands and how their management has evolved over time. This literature points to a
change in public lands management beginning in the 1970s, and many suggest that as this
change occurred, members of Congress became increasingly divided on the issue down
party lines. This trend of polarization can best be tracked by examining roll-call voting
behavior, on which many pieces of literature exist. I examine theories pertaining to the
president, interest groups, constituents, personal ideology, and political parties and how
each of these entities can influence a member’s roll-call voting decisions. However, a gap
in the literature exists in connecting roll-call voting to public lands policy. It is clear that
polarization has developed, but no literature to date documents the roll-call voting patterns
by party or theorizes as to what explanations best account for the divide. I end this chapter
by theorizing which of the prominent roll-call voting explanations best explains the
increased polarization on public lands policy in Congress.

Public Support for Public Lands Policy
National parks and public lands are one of the most widely favored areas of US
government amongst the public. Called “public” lands for a reason, these protected areas
across the country are set aside and protected for the benefit of the American people. They
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are places of recreation, education, and exploration. National parks and other public lands
provide Americans the opportunity to take part in collective ownership of some of our
nation’s most precious lands and resources, and to engage with important stories of our
nation’s history. Regardless of political party, ideology, and other demographic factors, the
American people overwhelmingly support and appreciate national parks and recognize the
value of government jurisdiction over public lands.
This popularity has been consistent through time, with Roper Reports finding a
77% favorable view of the NPS in 1983, when the question was first asked.1 Since then,
support has steadily increased, with a poll in 2018 showing 83% favored the NPS.2 These
numbers show that, on average, American citizens are strongly in favor of the National
Park Service (NPS). Additionally, polls show support not only for the NPS as a whole, but
for specific policies which cause controversy in Congress, where public lands are a much
more polarizing and partisan issue. One of these controversial areas is land use, as
Republicans in Congress consistently vote for less land allocation to the federal
government and more for the states. A 2014 poll reported that, contrary to members of
Congress who hope to limit federal land acquisition, 69% of respondents opposed
“stopping the creation of new national parks, wilderness areas, and monuments” while only
27% supported this measure.3 Funding of public lands is another example of a partisan
issue in Congress, with Republicans often being more conservative with allocations. A
2015 poll, however, showed that 71% of the public would like to see Congress use money

1

Roper Report 83-8, Aug. 1983
Pew Research Center for the People & the Press Poll, Jul. 2018
3
CAP Energy Voters Poll, Dec. 2014
2
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to repair and improve national parks. Broken down by party, 77% of Democrats answered
yes, and 64% of Republicans answered yes, a largely unified answer compared to that of
Congress.4
Public lands are also an issue area in which the public generally approves of the
government’s management. A 2015 Gallup Poll showed that when asked whether they
were “satisfied or dissatisfied with the work the government is doing” on national parks
and open space, 73% said they were satisfied. This number was significantly higher than
responses in the same survey for different issue areas, such as health care (43% satisfied),
foreign affairs (35% satisfied) and education (34% satisfied).5 Asked during the Obama
presidency, it is impressive to note the overwhelming support for government work on
national parks both by Democrats and Republicans. While other issues remain polarized in
public opinion, national parks prove to be widely favored across political parties and across
the nation.
In addition to widespread national support, support for parks can be seen in the
Western states alone. 93% of public lands are located in twelve Western states plus the
continental shelves (Turner and Isenberg 2018). Being from states with the largest
percentage of federal land, members of Congress from Western states are often the most
outspoken against public lands policies, seeing them as overpowering their state’s
jurisdiction over the land. A 2019 poll done by Colorado College shows that among
constituents in Western states (AZ, CO, ID, MT, NV, NM, UT, WY), public lands are a

4

Yale University/George Mason University Politics & Global Warming Survey, Nov.
2016
5
Gallup Poll, Apr. 2015
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priority, and emphasis is placed on preservation. The poll asked, with regards to the new
Congress, if more emphasis should be placed on “ensuring we protect sources of clean
water, our air quality and wildlife habitat while providing opportunities to visit and recreate
on our national public lands” or “ensuring we produce more domestic energy by
maximizing the amount of national public lands available for responsible oil and gas
drilling and mining.”6 65% of total respondents answered that preservation was more
important, while only 24% answered in favor of increased drilling and domestic energy
practices. Of these respondents, 39% identified as conservative, 33% as moderate, and only
23% as liberal.7 Although Western Republican members of Congress place an emphasis
on states’ rights and energy production, this emphasis is not reflected in the opinions of
their constituents.
As is evident by the wealth of polls on national parks and public lands, the
American people are widely in agreement on these issue areas. There is more bipartisan
public support for public lands than there is for almost any other issue, and this trend has
remained constant over time through different presidencies and other important national
contexts. However, as I will explore in depth in the coming pages of this chapter, public
lands are highly polarized and partisan within Congress today. Democrat members are
much more likely to vote in support of public lands policies than are their Republican
counterparts. This discrepancy between Congressional voting behavior and public opinion
creates an interesting area of study. To more fully understand potential reasons behind this,

6
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Colorado College Conservation in the West Poll, 2019
Colorado College Conservation in the West Poll, 2019
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the next sections of this chapter examine literature on the creation of public lands and
national parks in America, and how they have evolved over time.

Creation of Public Lands in the United States
As Americans expanded west throughout the 18th century, the federal government
acquired more and more land. Although much of this land was taken from indigenous
people, the government portrayed it as uninhabited wilderness never before experienced
by man (Sowards 2017). As photographers, writers, and others moved westward and were
awe struck by the natural landscape, they took photos, wrote books, and painted depictions
of the land for those back in the East. Growing public support for the Western land
manifested throughout the 1800s, and in 1872 Congress designated Yellowstone as the
world’s first national park. This designation of land to remain public and to retain its natural
condition set a precedent for public lands policy, and marked a pivot in public land history
(Sowards 2017).
It soon became clear that without larger bureaucratic agencies to manage the
increasing amount of federally protected public land, the previous economic exploitation
practices would prevail and the land would not be protected. The United States Forest
Service (USFS), under the Department of Agriculture (DOA), was the first agency created
in 1905 to address this problem. However, the USFS’s designation under the DOA and not
the Department of the Interior (DOI) demonstrated the belief that trees exist as a crop to be
used for the nation’s good (Sowards 2017). This belief reflects a fundamental difference
between two common practices in environmental protection: preservation and
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conservation. Preservationists want to protect the land and leave it untouched by man
because it has its own inherent value, while conservationists protect the land with the
purpose of using it for human gain. With the emphasis on utilizing trees for human
production and profit, the USFS exemplified conservation rather than preservation.
This created a distinction between the purpose of national forests and national
parks, the latter of which became known around the country for their majestic scenery.
Preservation of this scenery was the first priority of national park management, which
created an administrative contrast between the DOI’s park system and the DOA’s US
Forest Service. Leaders of the two departments disagreed over the purpose of the land
within their jurisdiction (Schneider-Hector 2014). After national conferences which
brought many voices in public lands management together, it was decided that “national
forests and national parks held different operational objectives; the first should utilize the
forests’ natural resources while the second should preserve the natural scenic attractions”
(Schneider-Hector 2014, 653). With that distinction established, the USFS and the DOI
worked towards a cooperative relationship to best manage the country’s natural resources.
As national parks became increasingly popular across the nation, a need for better
administration became apparent. In 1911, Secretary of the Interior Franklin Lane wrote a
letter to Congress in which he stated that increased visitation, lack of uniform regulations,
and inadequate funding provided a strong argument for the management of national parks
by a single agency (Schneider-Hector 2014). While yet to be given a formal organization,
national parks management moved in a more concrete direction in 1914 when Mark
Daniels was appointed as the first General Superintendent of National Parks. As one man
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with few resources, Daniels was unable to achieve much as far as management, but he did
establish three vital functions of national parks: to stimulate national patriotism, to
encourage education and health, and to promote travel (Schneider-Hector 2014). This sense
of national pride was essential for marketing national parks as the nation approached and
entered WWI. New Secretary of the Interior Stephen Mather was successful at marketing
national parks to Americans across the country as destinations for travel. He replaced
Daniels with Robert Marshall, who echoed the idea that American national parks were
unique in all the world and needed a single agency to oversee them (Schneider-Hector
2014).
In 1916, Congress passed the National Park Service Organic Act and formally
established the National Park Service, or NPS, under the Department of the Interior
(Schneider-Hector 2014). Mather became the first Director of the National Park Service,
and the agency finally had the organization and leadership that had been desired for
decades. In the years following 1916, national parks were established in the South and the
East, effectively nationalizing the system and expanding it beyond a Western project.
Designating parks such as Everglades, known for diverse ecosystems and wildlife rather
than scenic views, emphasized the importance of environmental preservation to the NPS’s
mission (Sowards 2017). Additionally, new national parks included not only areas of scenic
wilderness such as the Grand Canyon and Yosemite Valley, but also cultural and historic
sites. Preserving these sites as public land “celebrated a particular nationalism that
enshrined the American landscape as essential to national identity” (Sowards 2017, 7). The
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NPS began to take shape as a diverse collection of treasured lands across the nation, setting
aside important ecological, historical, and cultural sites.

Changes in Management of the National Park Service
As the National Park Service grew across the country and visitation began to rapidly
increase, the NPS and other public lands agencies intensified their management. Barton
(2016) describes a continuum of participation between the public and government
agencies: benefits participation, consultative participation, and collaborative participation.
At its origin, the NPS utilized benefits participation, as the organization focused on getting
funding from Congress, creating necessary positions within the service, and providing
inventory for existing parks. In this level of participation, public involvement is limited to
the benefits the public receives from the government agency. The NPS relied on a “topdown” approach for management during this time period and limited public input in park
management (Barton 2016).
With the passage of the Administrative Procedures Act of 1946, the NPS shifted
from benefits participation to consultative participation, in which the public has more
involvement. The APA mandated that federal agencies consult the public in administrative
decisions, and the park service demonstrated a commitment to increasing their
communication with the public (Barton 2016). However, they still relied on expertise to
develop infrastructure, including roads, campgrounds, visitor centers, and more. “Mission
66,” a project finished for the NPS’s 50th anniversary, spent $1 billion on this infrastructure.
The NPS and USFS also practiced intensive management over natural resources, including

16

managing watersheds, increasing timber harvests, and preventing forest fires (Sowards
2017). In 1946, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) was created to help manage
grazing and mining on public lands. Sowards (2017) describes the “iron triangle” of public
lands politics which existed from the 1940s-1960s: Congress, the BLM, and livestock
producer interest groups. As the NPS, USFS, and BLM struggled to “accommodate the
growing demands of public lands users for traditional commodity and recreational
purposes,” a shift in management strategies became clearly necessary (Sowards 2017, 16).
In the 1960’s and the 1970’s, the NPS shifted to collaborative participation, furthest
on the continuum towards public involvement (Barton 2016). Sowards (2017) describes
this shift in the 1960s and 1970s as a new set of management regimes with “greater federal
authority, stronger enforcement, better science, and improved public input” (17). The
Wilderness Act of 1964 was one of the most monumental pieces of legislation in the
environmental movement, as it recognized wilderness as land where “man himself is a
visitor who does not remain” and land that is “protected and managed so as to preserve its
natural conditions” (Sowards 2017, 17). From 1964-2015, protected wilderness grew from
9 to almost 110 million acres of public land (Turner and Isenberg 2018). Other policies,
such as the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970 and the Endangered Species Act of
1973, created new legal and ethical obligations of public lands management agencies. Both
of these policies were signed into law by President Nixon, a Republican, who declared the
1970’s the start of an environmental decade (Turner and Isenberg 2018). However, as
ecological preservation and economic growth began to conflict with one another,
polarizing controversies emerged. Democrats saw the environmental policies as not
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extensive or strict enough, and Republicans saw them as encroachments on natural resource
extraction and states’ rights (Sowards 2017). The Republican party, which had just a few
years earlier been known as strong on environmental issues, became vocal in its opposition
to federal environmental policy. Public lands policy, one small piece of the federal
environmental agenda, caused polarizing issues for the first time as a result.

Examples of Polarization on Public Lands Policy
While polarization on public lands today is seen primarily in Congress, it had its
roots in radical views of certain members of the public, and gained traction through public
demonstrations. One of the most notable public demonstrations is the Sagebrush Rebellion,
a public protest against the federal management of land in the Southwestern states. Rogers
(2009) summarizes the conflicts that formed the Sagebrush Rebellion, and the motivations
of the rebels as well as those that opposed the movement. His work specifically focuses on
Utah, a state with a high percentage of federally owned and managed land, and one where
anti-government sentiment is abundant in both the public and the legislators. Many other
Western states were also involved in the Rebellion, and in addition to Utah, state
governments in Arizona, New Mexico, and Wyoming passed Sagebrush Rebellion
legislation to return federal land to the state.
In Utah, public opinion was relatively split, making it difficult to tell whether more
citizens were in support of or against the Rebellion. Those who supported the movement
included “embattled ranchers, miners, and other rural people, who felt that the federal
government was an insensitive landlord and environmental legislation did not serve local
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interests” (Rogers 2009, 372). The opposition was composed of environmentalists,
recreational enthusiasts, and federal employees. The conflict between these two groups
came to a head in 1980 when Grand County commissioners, opposed to federal
management of land, organized a protest against the Bureau of Land Management (BLM)
designation of a parcel of Utah land as a wilderness study area. An estimated 250-300
citizens attended the protest, consisting of speeches and the symbolic bulldozing into
federal land. On the same day, an environmental group called Earth First! held a rally
protesting the bulldozing, representing both the local opposition and the public opinion
against the Sagebrush Rebellion nationwide (Rogers 2009).
The movement reached the national policy level when Utah Senator Hatch
introduced Senate Bill 1680 to return the “rightful title” to public lands in the West to the
states. The bill failed to gain traction outside of a few Western Senators, and nationwide,
the bill did not garner much public support. Generally, many Americans held the opinion
that the Sagebrush Rebellion was “an illegitimate solution to western problems” (Rogers
2009, 377). Although the sentiments behind the movement reflected the need for more
federal and state cooperation on the management of public lands, the Sagebrush leaders’
quick call to completely dissolve federal ownership lost the movement its credibility.
Rogers (2009) explains that “the rebellion may have thrust public lands issues to the fore
and prompted land managers to be more responsive to local concerns, but its primary
legacy was that it served to polarize, alienate, and entrench, not bring together” (381). Even
after the Sagebrush Rebellion, extreme rural Westerners have continued to fight against
public lands. Although public lands are overwhelmingly popular among the national
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public, Republicans in Congress today reflect the extreme views, and bipartisan agreement
has become increasingly difficult to come by. The examples that follow show just how
challenging reaching consensus on public lands policy in Congress has become.
Gómez (2000) studies public lands policy in the 1990s, specifically President
Clinton’s decision to establish the Grand-Staircase-Escalante National Monument. This
monument protected 1.7 million acres of land in southern Utah, and received widespread
support on the national level. However, conflict over the decision still occurred, with the
opposition being led by conservative members of Congress. The primary arguments they
gave included states’ rights, private property rights, and economic ruin in the area (Gómez
2000). This disagreement reflected the wider conflict with regards to public lands policy
in the West. Many similar instances have occurred in Congress, with Democratic members
pushing for preservation and arguing that tourism will boost the economy, and Republican
members arguing in favor of multiple-use and stating that mining, grazing, and other
private use of land is the surest way to promote economic growth. Despite studies
conducted between 1970 and 2015 which show that counties with more federal land
experience more economic growth, members of Congress representing communities
centered around extractive industries have greater concern for the economic value of oil,
gas, and coal (Turner and Isenberg 2018). The central issue in all of these Congressional
debates is “the right of the federal government to impose its will, even in the case of
preservation, over the individual states” (Gómez 2000, 152). Gómez (2000) asserts that
Clinton resorted to executive action on public lands policy as a way to bypass the partisan
gridlock in Congress on the issue.
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Another case study examined by Gómez (2000) is the National Park System
Reform Act of 1995, a bill with the purpose of identifying those parks that are “not worthy
of the designation of national park” (153). One of the strongest proponents for reform,
Republican Congressman Hansen of Utah, introduced an amendment to establish a
National Park System Review Commission. This commission would recommend specific
parks to be closed, leaving only an estimated 54 parks in the system. Hansen argued that
this would save money spent on the parks he deemed unworthy, and focus on the true
“crown jewels” of the NPS (Gómez 2000, 153). However, the public was largely against
his amendment. By only saving the large, wilderness parks, Hansen’s proposal would mean
a “generic national park system with no regard for regional or ethnic distinctions—in
effect, a social and political regression to pre-civil rights America” (Gómez 2000, 157).
Iconic sites such as the Statue of Liberty would not retain park status under his bill.
Additionally, many in the public were critical of the bill as a whole because it subverts
responsibility away from Congress. Congress had established more than 80 new parks, and
yet Republican members had been largely unwilling to grant the Department of the Interior
the funding needed to properly manage these parks. In other words, the maintenance
backlog and other funding issues faced by the NPS were created by Congress, and thus
need to be solved by them as well. Simply getting rid of park sites was not the answer that
the public was looking for. The bill ended up failing by a vote of 231 against to 180 in
favor. Unsurprisingly, the Utah delegation voted along partisan lines, with Democrats
opposing and Republicans supporting (Gómez 2000) Among Congress as a whole, the
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votes fell heavily along party lines, as 159 Republicans supported while only 67 opposed,
and 163 Democrats opposed while only 21 supported.8
These examples demonstrate the trend of the Republican party moving away from
environmental issues starting with the Reagan administration, a movement described by
Turner and Isenberg (2018) as “The Republican Reversal.” Beginning in the 1980’s under
President Reagan, Republicans viewed public lands as visions of abundance: God-given
resources to be used by the American people. Reagan appointed James Watt as Secretary
of the Interior, a man with ties to the oil and gas industry who did not consider himself an
environmentalist. Watt described his stance on public lands as “market oriented” and the
Reagan administration set out goals to produce 85% of crude oil, 40% of natural gas, and
35% of coal in the United States from public lands (Turner and Isenberg 2018). Watt’s
policies caused national backlash among the public, and membership in national
environmental groups doubled from 1979-1983 (Turner and Isenberg 2018). The partisan
divide continued to grow in the next two decades, as environmental attitudes flipped with
each administration. The H.W. Bush administration took on more of the Republican
policies of Nixon, and Clinton actively promoted environmentalism and utilized the
Antiquities Act to preserve large areas of public land. George W. Bush brought about a
revival of Reagan era anti-environmentalism, which was flipped again by President
Obama’s focus on the environment and designation of more than 5.1 million acres of public
lands in his second term (Turner and Isenberg 2018). Most recently, under President
Trump, we have seen many examples of public lands reductions and disregard for

8

H.R. 260 National Park System Reform Act 1995
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environmental issues. Turner and Isenberg (2018) demonstrate this trend with a data
analysis on the voting score on environmental issues given to members of Congress by the
League of Conservation Voters. Data from 1970-2015 shows that Democrats and
Republicans went from being mere percentage points away from each other in voting habits
in the 1970s to Democrats receiving scores in the 90th percentile and Republicans falling
to the single digits in 2015. According to Turner and Isenberg (2018), public lands are a
key part of this Republican reversal. Although commonly known as “America’s Best Idea,”
national parks and public lands have become a highly polarized issue in Congress. To better
understand the implications of this polarization, I turn next to literature on the governance
of public lands and the respective powers of the Department of the Interior, the president,
and Congress.

Governance of Public Lands
The Department of the Interior handles the big picture of parks management as well
as day-to-day operations at each of the parks. More than 20,000 employees work for the
NPS, who are led by the Director and their team of senior executives who work with the
policies and funding designated by Congress. There are seven regions in the NPS, and each
has a regional director and office staff that work with the leaders at the national office to
manage and implement national programs. In addition to the staff in Washington, DC and
the regional offices, the majority of NPS staff work across the country at the parks
themselves. Each individual park is led by a Superintendent, who oversees day-to-day
operations at the park and ensures that national programs work effectively at their park

23

("Organizational Structure") . While the Department of the Interior clearly handles the
majority of national parks and public lands governance, both the president and Congress
hold crucial roles in the development of public lands policy.
The president has unique jurisdiction when it comes to public lands policy. One of
the primary powers given to the president in the constitution is executive action. A form of
executive action is the presidential proclamation, which allows the president to define
situations that become legal or economic truth (Rottinghaus and Maier 2007). In terms of
public lands, presidential proclamations can be used to establish national monuments and
set aside land to be preserved for historical, cultural, or natural reasons. Second only to
trade, national parks and public lands are the subject of much of the presidential
proclamations given throughout history: 13% of all proclamations (Rottinghaus and Maier
2007).
Passed into law in 1906, the Antiquities Act is what gives the president the power
to use presidential proclamations to create national monuments for the protection of
cultural, historic, scenic, or scientific land (McManamon 2014). Theodore Roosevelt,
president when the act was made law, was a great proponent of the Antiquities Act and
influenced his successors to use the presidential power. Since 1906, more than 100 million
acres of land have been preserved for public use by all American citizens (McManamon
2014). In addition to being a significant presidential power, the Antiquities Act created a
“foundation for government policies” that recognizes the value of public interest in and
education about our nation’s cultural and natural resources (McManamon 2014). There is
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now a precedent within our government that American citizens value public lands, and that
their protection is important.
Just as the president has the power of presidential proclamation, Congress has the
power of the purse. With regards to public lands, one of Congress’s primary roles is that
of the budget. Congress has control over funding that will be allocated for many aspects of
national parks, from educational programs to maintenance and upkeep (Ansson 1999).
Each year, it is up to Congress to determine how much money will be provided to public
lands. As national parks are becoming less isolated, they are threatened by over visitation
and degradation of natural resources. Increasing costs are popping up to slow these effects
and attempt to keep national parks wild (Ansson 1999). Additionally, there are billions of
dollars of unfunded maintenance projects in national parks which only Congress has the
power to allocate money for (Ansson 1999).
There are many potential sources Congress may draw on for the money needed to
continue in necessary preservation. The most straightforward policy is for Congress to
simply allocate more money from the national budget for public lands each year. Aside
from that, funding may come from outside sources such as higher use fees, higher
concessionaire fees, funding from bonds, and funding from the private sector (Ansson
1998). Whatever the source, increased funding for national parks has been shown to be a
crucial change that is needed moving forward. As the branch with control of the budget,
Congress will play an essential role in the future of public lands preservation.
In addition to the budget, Congress also has the power to pass all federal resource
management bills to be signed into law by the president. These include, of course, all public

25

lands bills and bills pertaining to the NPS. Though the president may veto a bill, as done
by President Reagan on the Montana Wilderness Bill, a three-fifths majority of the House
and Senate may override a veto (Loomis 2002). This power to pass laws is particularly
significant, as Congress determines the content and scope of all the policies that the federal
public lands agencies then go on to implement. Just as significant is Congress’s power to
block bills from becoming law. If the majority of members are against public lands policies,
they are able to prevent much from being enacted in parks across the nation. Polarization
in Congress, then, is likely to contribute to increased conflict over public lands bills before
they become law. One of the clearest ways to demonstrate the polarization in Congress on
public lands policy is to examine roll-call voting behavior. To further understand the
potential contributing factors to this polarization, I now turn to the wealth of literature on
roll-call voting behavior.

Roll-Call Voting
When examining the policy opinions of members of Congress, the most concrete
area to study is roll-call voting behavior. There are no grey areas in roll-call voting, a
member must either vote for a bill, against a bill, or not vote at all. This decisive measure
provides a member’s ultimate stance on an issue. Members make hundreds of roll-call
votes during their tenure in Congress, and in doing so develop a reputation for what issues
they prioritize, support, and oppose. Understanding roll-call voting behavior, therefore, is
crucial to understanding what policies have a chance in our political system. Several
theories exist as to what explains roll-call voting behavior, and the literature is broadly
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organized into five prominent influencers: the president, interest groups, constituents,
members’ personal ideology, and political party. In the following sections, I will examine
each of these areas of literature, and discuss how each may have an impact on the roll-call
decisions of members of Congress.
Influence of the President on Roll-Call Voting Behavior
Under the US system of checks and balances, the president and Congress hold
certain powers over each other. The most obvious leverage that the president holds over
Congress is their veto power. In addition to the formal power of legislative veto, presidents
wield many informal powers that can be used to influence congressional roll-call voting
behavior. Neustadt (1960) describes these informal means as the president’s “power to
persuade” (33). Members of Congress can greatly benefit from a good relationship with
the president, and are keenly aware that successfully doing their jobs and furthering their
ambitions may depend upon the president. As Neustadt states, “in congressional relations
there are some things that no one but the president can do” (Neustadt 1960, 57). The
president can use this dependency to their advantage, engaging in behind-the-scenes
bargaining to influence the roll-call votes of members of Congress.
Additionally, the president can use public pressure to forward their legislative
agenda and push Congress to vote in accordance with the president’s preferred policies
(Neustadt 1960). In order to get Congress’s attention, the president can use public support
through a strategy called going public (Kernell 1997). Addressing the American people in
press conferences, primetime speeches, and other high-profile appearances can influence
public support in favor of the president’s legislative agenda. Kernell (1977) states that as
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“the decline of party and institutional leadership in Congress and the rise of divided
government have made the Washington community progressively more susceptible to
public opinion,” members of Congress will more often take the public’s opinions into
account (127). By going public, the president has the chance to get the American people
on their side and make it more difficult for Congress to ignore their legislative agendas.
The president can also utilize public opinion to impact roll-call voting behavior of
members of Congress through his or her popularity, specifically within the member’s
district. Edwards’ (1978) study finds that the more a constituency favors the president, the
more members of Congress will vote in favor of policies the president is pushing. While
many factors that impact public opinion, such as demographic characteristics, are linked to
multiple facets of society, presidential support is a directly political variable. Because
presidential support is more political than some other explanations of roll-call voting, it
“has greater value in explaining linkages between citizens and their elected
representatives” (Edwards 1978, 167). Constituents’ opinions of the president, and perhaps
more broadly the political party of the president, provide incentives for representatives to
vote accordingly. Ignoring these factors may result in lowered constituency support and
even threaten reelection chances (Edwards 1978).
Influence of Interest Groups on Roll-Call Voting Behavior
Another area of literature on roll-call voting behavior surrounds the impact of
interest groups and money in politics. Wawro’s (2001) research shows that PACs and other
interest groups donate to members of Congress who already have a proven voting record
of voting with the PAC’s priorities. Utilizing panel data methods, he finds that
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“contributions have no systematic effects on roll-call votes” once individual effects such
as the personal ideology of the members are taking into consideration (Wawro 2001).
However, spending patterns show that this lack of direct causation does not deter PACs
from making donations. They continue to support candidates and members who reflect
their priorities, and encourage them to back certain policy agendas. Interest groups,
therefore, are more focused on changing the overall legislative agenda than on changing
specific votes of members. Additionally, Wawro finds that if PACs and interest groups do
influence roll-call voting, it occurs in the long-term rather than the short term. He states
that “if such bias exists, it is more likely due to the fact that PACs contribute
overwhelmingly to incumbents, which makes it difficult for challengers who would vote
differently to replace incumbents” (Wawro 2001, 576-577). Rather than attempting to
persuade members to change their votes, interest groups put their money into supporting
candidates who already vote in their favor and into preventing those who oppose their
platforms from being elected.
Stratmann’s (1996) research shows that one of the primary goals of PACs,
specifically labor and corporate PACs, is to establish a voting majority in Congress for the
political party they support. To do so, they prioritize giving to members whose reelections
are not as guaranteed and whose spots are in jeopardy of being flipped by a member of the
other party. Stratmann’s study also gives support to the theory that constituency
preferences matter with regards to congressional roll-call voting. Stratmann states that “the
fact that campaign contributors invest money in candidates based on the preferences of
legislators' support constituencies is a fine proof that representatives consider their support
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constituency in legislative decisions” (Stratmann 1996, 632). Interest group contributions
and constituency beliefs are intertwined in their influence on the decision-making process
of members of Congress.
Influence of the People on Roll-Call Voting Behavior
As apparent in the ways in which the president and interest groups utilize public
opinion, constituents have great influence over roll-call voting behavior. One of the
cornerstone pieces of literature on this area comes from David Mayhew, who describes
members of Congress as “single-minded seekers of reelection” (Mayhew 2004, 5). He
argues that as reelection is necessary to achieve any other goals, it is the primary goal of
any member of Congress. Therefore, members will constantly work towards reelection,
and will continue to do what has worked for them in the past. Mayhew also describes
Congress as a place that promotes careerism – meaning that the salaries, staff, and
resources provided to members promote a long career on Capitol Hill (Mayhew 2004). If
members are devoted to a long-term career on the Hill, they will prioritize reelection.
This focus on reelection puts a focus on constituents, as they are the sole
determinants of whether a member will be reelected. Mayhew refers to this as an
accountability relationship between members of Congress and their electorate. To reach
their constituents and develop this relationship, members must “build a power base that is
substantially independent of party” (Mayhew 2004, 26). According to this theory, they
respond first to their constituents’ needs, and then to their political party. Mayhew relates
his theory to roll-call voting behavior through what he calls position taking. Position taking
is one of the primary ways that members of Congress can attempt to strengthen their
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relationship with constituents and win their votes. It is one of the most public and concrete
actions they take on a regular basis. Mayhew argues that members take on a conservative
strategy, voting with past positions that have done well with constituents and only taking
risks when absolutely necessary. He also points out that roll-call votes are seen by
constituents more on the aggregate than on each single vote, and constituents care more
about a member’s overall voting record (Mayhew 2004).
In another well-known piece on the effect of constituents on member roll-call
voting, Fenno (1977) describes what are known as the concentric circles of constituencies.
These include geographical, reelection, primary, and personal constituencies, and members
develop specific tactics to relate to each of these groups of voters. Geographical
constituencies include all citizens in a member’s district, regardless of demographics or
location. Reelection constituencies include the people who a member thinks and hopes will
vote for him, while primary constituencies include a member’s strongest supporters. The
primary constituency draws a greater amount of the member’s interest, because they are
the constituents who will help win the member reelection. Finally, the personal
constituency includes the member’s closest political advisers, personal confidants, and
those who support the member emotionally (Fenno 1977).
Fenno (1977) describes the strategies that members use to reach each of these
constituencies as their “home style” (889). A primary aspect of a member’s home style is
the allocation of resources: where a congressman or woman chooses to put their time and
staff. Additionally, home style is affected by the member’s “presentation of self” and how
they hope to be perceived by their constituents (Fenno 1977, 898). Members of the House
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of Representatives hope to demonstrate to their constituents a sense of their qualifications,
a sense of identification with constituents, and a sense of empathy. These three qualities
are key to building trust with constituents, and gaining votes.
Home style is also affected by a member’s explanation of their work in Washington
(Fenno 1977). With each roll-call vote they make, members know that they may be called
upon by their constituency to explain their vote choice, and that their explanation can either
help them win or lose constituent support. Therefore, they keep their constituents’
preferences in mind, ideally voting with the majority of their constituents to prevent having
to explain an unpopular decision. In addition to worrying how constituents will perceive
their vote, members must also consider how their vote will be portrayed to constituents by
political opponents (Sinclair 2006). In an increasingly polarized Congress, members of
opposing parties often actively work against one another. They campaign not just for
themselves, but against their opponent. Members of Congress will use whatever they can
to influence constituents, including the voting record of their challenger. Therefore,
members worry how their roll-call votes will be portrayed to constituents by current or
future political opponents (Sinclair 2006). When making roll-call decisions, they keep in
mind how the vote may be construed and what their constituents may think.
Influence of Personal Ideology on Roll-Call Voting Behavior
Despite the wealth of literature on the impact of constituents on roll-call voting
behavior, some scholars argue that a member’s personal ideology is the more important
factor. Burden (2007) describes personal preferences as those that are free from external
influence by constituents, party, and interest groups. According to Burden, these personal
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preferences matter, and have a significant impact on legislators’ substantive activities. One
aspect of a member’s personal preferences, ideology, is often times correlated with their
constituents. Burden argues that legislators will often vote in line with their constituents’
beliefs without intentionally doing so, and this coincidence overstates the level of
constituent control on roll-call voting behavior (Burden 2007). In his study on the Senate
specifically, Levitt (1996) finds that compared to constituent opinions and party
preferences, “the Senator’s own ideology is overwhelmingly the most important
determinant of roll-call voting patterns” (427). However, because ideology is strongly
correlated with both political party and voter preferences, these other explanations cannot
be overlooked. With regards to the connection between ideology and voter preferences,
Levitt finds that members vote with the preferences of their “support constituency.” These
voters are the ones who already align with the ideology of the member, therefore making
the vote easier (Levitt 1996).
In addition to ideology, the other three aspects of personal preferences that Burden
(2007) cites are members’ values, information, and self-interest. Values, usually aligning
with ideology, are also typically similar to those of a members’ constituents. Common
areas of legislation that are impacted by values include health, family history, and religious
values (Burden 2007). Information and self-interest, however, pose distinct preferences
that make a legislator unique. Information and past expertise, such as education or
occupation, have the ability to inform a member’s roll-call voting decisions. If a member
has extensive knowledge and personal experience with an issue area that influences their
opinion, they are likely to trust this knowledge over the surface level beliefs of their voters.
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In this case, it may be in the best interest of constituents that members stick to their personal
preferences. Self-interest, on the other hand, rarely serves as a motivation that works for
constituents (Burden 2007). However, members are still likely to vote for policies that
further their self-interest.
Influence of Political Parties on Roll-Call Voting Behavior
The final major area of literature on roll-call voting behavior discusses the influence
of political parties. Despite claims that members respond to their constituents or themselves
before their party, literature on political parties and their influence on roll-call voting
behavior shows that party matters, and matters increasingly in recent years. Ansolabehere
et al (2001) describe three areas of roll-call voting on which parties exert the most
influence. First, party influence is strongest on close votes when the House is evenly
divided. Party leaders can whip their members to follow party platforms when voting on
contentious issues. Second, parties hold more control over their members’ votes with
regards to procedural votes. This is because “party leaders and their organizations use
agenda control as their principal tool to control policy” (Ansolabehere et al 2001, 552).
Lastly, party influence is strong when voting on issues that define the party platforms.
Parties must maintain their reputations in certain issue areas, and rely on their members to
vote in accordance with their platform. Moral and religious issues are the exception to this
rule, and although members often still vote with their parties on them due to personal
beliefs, “these issues are viewed by the parties as highly personal matters on which
members are free to ‘vote their conscience’” (Ansolabehere et al 2001, 555).
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In addition to political parties as a whole, the literature shows that the trend of party
polarization also contributes to roll-call voting behavior. Ansolabehere et al (2001) show
that partisan divergence is stronger among legislators than it is among constituents,
meaning Congress is more polarized than the public is. As parties continue to move in the
opposite direction of one another, they continue to define their positions on issues and push
their members to vote in line with the party platform. Less and less issues are seen as
moderate or bipartisan and members are expected to follow their party on roll-call votes.
The trend of political polarization in Congress dates back to the 1970’s, and one of
the primary explanations is constituent sorting. Since the early 1970’s, voters became
balkanized, separating themselves geographically by ideology (Theriault 2008). This
sorting was driven largely by the overarching transformation of conservative southern
Democrats to conservative southern Republicans. However, sorting happened at a local
level too, as constituents moved into politically homogenous neighborhoods and
congressional districts. In addition to self-sorting, Theriault (2008) states that the process
of redistricting has produced increasingly polarized constituencies. Districts were drawn
that overwhelmingly support one candidate, and provided safe seats for the more
ideologically extreme incumbents. The primary election has come to matter much more
than the general election in many districts, forcing candidates to become increasingly
liberal or conservative to please party activists (Theriault 2008).
In addition to explanations that center around constituent polarization, an
institutional explanation exists as well. In Sinclair’s (2006) extensive overview of
polarization in Congress, she acknowledges that as Congress as a whole has polarized,
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committees have polarized as well. Though they used to be known for bipartisan
cooperation, committees now serve as tools of the majority leadership to influence policy.
In fact, Sinclair states that there is now an expectation for party leaders to pursue partisan
advantage. In an attempt to prevent success by the other side, parties unify around their
leadership. Polarization means there is less flexibility to vote against one’s own party.
Additionally, the minority party is often excluded almost entirely in the House, where
disparity between the majority and minority is greater, and is still largely ignored in the
Senate. This means that, due to polarization, less legislation is passed into law, and less
makes it through the House and Senate at all.
A combined theory shows that both constituent polarization and institutional
explanations combine to create the polarization seen in Congress today. Theriault (2008)
states that “it is only when members, who come from increasingly polarized constituencies,
meet in Washington, D.C., and elect leaders who implement their party rules that the
current extent of party polarization comes into focus” (55). As polarization has increased
on all fronts, fewer members are having to choose between voting with their constituents
and their party leaders. This has led to more ideological roll-call voting than in the past,
because members are more willing to cede power to their party leadership to compel party
loyalty.
Theories on the influence of political party on roll-call voting behavior as well as
those on the president, interest groups, constituents, and personal ideology combine to form
convincing arguments as to the dynamic explanations for members’ vote decisions. While
no one theory can completely account for all roll-call votes on its own, some are more
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useful than others in explaining certain decisions. In the case of roll-call voting on public
lands bills, there are explanations which seem to fit quite well and others which lack
powerful correlation. In the follow section, I will describe my own theories as to what
influences roll-call voting behavior on public lands policies.

Theory
Of the five theories on what influences roll-call voting, I expect the influence of
political party to be the most relevant to public lands policies. Party influence on roll-call
voting is strongest when members vote on issues that define the party platforms. Size of
government is an example of an issue which parties prioritize and which defines party
platforms. Democrats have set beliefs about the larger role of government in society while
Republicans champion small government and states’ rights. Therefore, on roll-call votes
that have to do with size of government, parties are more likely to exercise influence over
members to get them to vote along party lines (Ansolabehere et. al 2001). As public lands
policies are often centered around the federal versus state government debate, I expect that
roll-call votes on public lands will be influenced by the parties. This reflects the idea that
although public lands are widely supported among the public, in Congress the Republican
Party pushes its own small government agenda to vote against pro-public lands policies.
Additionally, I expect that the trend of polarization of the political parties
contributes to polarization with regards to public lands policies. Due to the increased
importance of political parties and party leadership, there is now an expectation for party
leaders to pursue partisan advantage. This expectation has its roots in the fact that members
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have come to see their party as far superior; “each side really does see the other’s policy
and electoral success as disastrous for the country, and … anything is justified to avert such
a catastrophe” (Sinclair 2006, 346). Even if public lands are not seen as necessarily against
the Republican agenda, they are seen as for the Democratic agenda. This leads any win on
public lands to be perceived as a win for Democrats. Therefore, I expect the Republican
party to rally around their leaders to oppose public lands, even if it goes against the opinions
of their constituents or their personal ideology.
A key aspect of my theory on polarization is the change in polarization over time.
I expect that, when looked at overtime, polarization on public lands policy will increase
and differences between the parties will become more apparent. I expect that this trend will
reflect the general trend of Congressional polarization that has been well documented since
the 1970s. Although public lands are not an inherently partisan issue, and public opinion
on them remains widely favorable, I expect that public lands policy got folded into the
larger polarization conflict in Congress. My first hypothesis is that over time, as the
political parties have become increasingly polarized along party lines, roll-call votes on
public lands policy have also polarized along party lines, and partisan identification has
become more predictive as to whether or not a member of Congress will vote for or against
public lands policy. Subsequently, I expect that Republican members of Congress will be
less likely than their Democratic counterparts to vote for public lands policies.
Despite the strong arguments in favor of the influence of political party, the
influence of constituents and personal ideology on roll-call voting behavior on public lands
cannot go completely unnoticed. While there is a significant partisan divide on these
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policies, there are instances in which Republican members break from party lines and vote
in favor of public lands policies. I theorize that these votes outside the norm result from
factors specific to that member of Congress or that member’s constituency. If a member of
Congress represents a district or state with great public support for public lands, they may
choose to support public lands policies that relate to their constituency. Members of
Congress may also have personal connections to public lands which influence their vote,
such as childhood vacations to national parks or a great love of outdoor recreation. My
second hypothesis is that among Republican members of Congress today, votes in favor of
public lands policies, and therefore against their political party, can be explained by
constituent support for public lands or a personal connection to public lands.
With regard to the influence of the president and interest groups on public lands
roll-call votes in Congress, I do not expect to see as much influence. Although the
presidential administrations from Reagan on have had influence on the overall attitudes of
the two parties towards the environment, I do not expect that presidents have direct and
isolated impacts on roll-call vote choice. Interest groups, the literature shows, have much
larger influence over the greater legislative agenda than on specific votes. While all five of
the theoretical explanations for roll-call voting behavior have the potential to influence
voting on public lands, I theorize that political parties have the greatest influence, followed
by constituents and personal ideology, and lastly the president and interest groups.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
Introduction
This project seeks to explain Congressional roll-call voting behavior on public
lands policy, an issue that earns widespread, bipartisan support from the public.
Specifically, I hope to determine the effect of partisanship on Congressional roll-call votes
on public lands over time. Simply put, my research question is:
What explains Congressional roll-call voting on public lands policy and how has
this changed over time?
The general literature documents a trend of polarization between the two political parties
since the 1970s, encompassing a wide array of issue areas. Although public lands are not
an inherently partisan issue, and public opinion on them remains widely favorable, I expect
that public lands policy got folded into the larger polarization of Congress. My first
hypothesis can be stated as:
H1: Over time, partisan identification has become more predictive as to whether or
not a member of Congress will vote for or against public lands policy.
I expect that this trend will follow the trend of polarization between Congressional
Democrats and Republicans on environmental issues as a whole, and the trend of more
general party polarization. To test H1, I will run a set of quantitative regression analyses of
data on roll-call votes on public lands policy. I will run the vote model for votes during
different Congresses, from the 1970s to today, to see if the party identification coefficient
becomes larger and more significant over time.
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While there is a significant partisan divide on these policies, there are instances in
which Republican members break from party lines and vote in favor of public lands
policies. I theorize that these votes outside the norm result from factors specific to that
member of Congress or that member’s constituency. My second hypothesis can be stated
as:
H2: Among Republican members of Congress, votes in favor of public lands policies
can be explained by constituent support for public lands or a personal connection
to public lands.
To test H2, I will run a content analysis of tweets, press releases, or other public statements
made by Republican members who have voted against their party on public lands policies.
Specifically, I will hand code for key phrases that indicate constituent support for or
personal connection to public lands.

Strengths and Weaknesses of My Methods
There are both strengths and limitations to all forms of empirical research, and the
methodologies I have chosen for my study are no exception. To test H1, I will use a
regression analysis. Quantitative analysis has several strengths, with its primary asset being
high external validity. High external validity means that the researcher has the ability to
generalize the results across population, time, and setting (Johnson and Reynolds 2012).
High external validity is important to my project, as I intend to select a sample of public
lands policies on which to analyze roll-call votes and generalize these findings to public
lands policies as a whole. Additionally, a key aspect of my project is the time scale and the

41

longitudinal nature of the quantitative analysis. A distinct advantage of longitudinal
analysis is that because I will be measuring cross sections at different times, I can measure
the change in the level of the variables (Johnson and Reynolds 2012). However, limitations
to this type of quantitative analysis do exist. The most significant weakness of nonexperimental methods is their lower level of internal validity. In quantitative analysis, it
can be challenging to rule out all alternative explanations and causality is more difficult to
ascertain (Johnson and Reynolds 2012). To combat this limitation, I will control for
potential spurious relationships and best determine the variables at work.
To test H2, I will use content analysis and will code by hand rather than through a
computer. A strength of content analysis is that the researcher is able to access subjects that
they would have been otherwise unable to contact (Johnson and Reynolds 2012). As the
members of Congress whom I will study are busy, high profile individuals, it is unlikely
that I would have been able to contact them directly through other means. Additionally,
content analysis allows the researcher to increase the sample size above what would be
possible through interviews or other methods at a low cost (Johnson and Reynolds 2012).
An advantage of hand coding the content analysis is that I can interpret the key words and
phrases within a greater context. The primary disadvantage of using content analysis is
access to records. Written records may be incomplete, inaccessible, or never documented
in the first place (Johnson and Reynolds 2012). Additionally, it is important to keep in mind
that written records are likely to be biased in favor of the author. One significant limitation
of hand coding for content analysis instead of using a computer in ensuring validity. It is
possible to account for this by determining “a precise explanation of the procedures
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followed and content categories used” (Johnson and Reynolds 2012, 294). Another
limitation of hand coding is the greater amount of time it takes.

Methodology
In this Independent Study, I will study roll-call votes and statements of Senators. I
have chosen the Senate largely because state lines are constant over time, while House
districts are subject to change. Because I am performing a longitudinal analysis, it is
important that constituency boundaries are held constant over time. For a given state in a
given year, the constituency is identical and thus controlled for in the analysis. An
additional advantage of analyzing the Senate is that there are only 100 Senators in a given
Congress, as opposed to 435 members of the House. By only examining data from 100
Senators per time period, I am able to include more Congresses in my research and
therefore have more thorough findings. In addition, the majority of the literature on
polarization in Congress has been done on the House of Representatives. Studies find that
polarization in the House is reflected in the Senate, but less studies focus on that particular
chamber. By examining the Senate, this study will also help fill a gap in the research.
Testing H1
To determine the effect of partisan identification on Senators’ roll-call voting
behavior on public lands policy over time, I will perform multiple multivariate regression
analyses. Multivariate regression will allow me to test for the effect of partisan
identification on vote choice while also controlling for other variables which may affect
vote choice, such as personal ideology. I will also perform a difference of means test for
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each Congress, which will allow me to track the mean difference in vote score between the
two parties over time. I will begin my longitudinal analysis in the 1970s, the decade in
which the general trend of partisan polarization in Congress began. This will allow me to
examine vote choice on public lands policy during the entire polarization time frame. From
the 1970s to the present, therefore, I will select two Congresses per decade to analyze.
Within those Congresses, I will determine the five most significant public lands policies
that came to a vote in the Senate. These policies will be chosen based on their level of
direct impact on national parks or other public lands, as well as wildlife and visitors to
those lands. I will use the existing environmental scorecards done by the League of
Conservation Voters to aid in selecting the public lands policies.
Once I have selected the policies from each Congress, I will create my own
scorecard for each Congress based on Senators’ voting records. Voting in favor of all five
public lands policies will equate to 1, voting for four will equate to 0.8, and so on. If a
Senator did not vote on the bill or was absent, that vote will not count towards their total
number of votes. If a Senator votes on less than three of the policies, they are not eligible
for a rating. After giving each Senator within each Congress their rating, I will compare
the scores received by Democrats and Republicans over time. This comparison will show
whether or not the party identification coefficient becomes larger and more significant over
time, in line with the more general polarization trend.
Testing H2
To determine what explanations Republican Senators today give when voting in
favor of public lands policies, and therefore against their party, I will perform a content
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analysis of tweets, press releases, or other public statements made by Republican Senators
following their votes. I will use the database Quorum Federal to filter for mentions of public
lands and national parks made by Senators. Within Quorum Federal, I will filter the results
based on the timeframe of the 114th Congress, or January 3rd, 2015 to January 3rd, 2017. I
have chosen the 114th Congress because I wanted to pick a Congress as recent as possible,
one in the height of polarization. The most recent Congress I used in testing H1, the 115th,
simply did not have enough individual case studies of Republicans with higher-thannormal vote scores. The 114th, therefore, provides the best option. The specific search terms
I will utilize within Quorum Federal are “national parks” and “public lands.” Within these
search results, I will code for certain phrases to come up with my results.
One factor I hypothesize will have an effect on the explanation of these outlier votes
is personal ideology, specifically personal connection to and experiences with public lands.
To test this, I will select two Republican Senators from the same state, therefore
representing the same constituency, who voted differently on public lands policies. By
holding the constituency variable constant, these case studies are meant to test for the effect
personal ideology and experiences have on public statements about public lands. As
explained in my literature review chapter, personal ideology and experiences are one of the
most common explanations for roll-call voting behavior. It is my expectation that when
party cannot explain the public lands vote choice, as with outlying Republicans, it is likely
that personal ideology may have been involved. For the Senator who voted in favor of
public lands, I will hand code for key phrases that indicate personal support for and
connection to public lands within the greater context of their statements. Specifically, I will
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look references to the following: hiking, camping, backpacking, hunting, fishing,
swimming, biking, skiing, snowboarding, ice skating, family vacations, or road trips. Using
the data, I will determine what factors the Senator uses as an explanation for breaking from
their party.
Another factor I hypothesize will have an effect on the explanations of outlier votes
among Republican Senators is constituency. To test this, I will select two Republican
Senators from different states, therefore representing different constituencies, who
otherwise have very similar DW-NOMINATE scores and yet who voted differently on
public lands policies. By holding the personal ideology variable constant, these case studies
were meant to test for the effect of constituency on public statements about public lands.
As explained in my literature review chapter, constituency is another one of the most
common explanations for roll-call voting behavior. It is my expectation that if the personal
ideology and experiences which I referenced above are not involved, then constituency is
a likely explanation for roll-call voting behavior. For the Senator who voted in favor of
public lands, I will hand code for key phrases that indicate constituent support for and
connection to public lands. Specifically, I will look for key phrases surrounding the public
lands and national parks located in that state. References to constituency appreciation for
and pride in their state’s public lands will sufficiently demonstrate the reasons given by a
Senator for voting against their party on public lands issues.
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Variables
For this Independent Study, I will define my independent variable (IV) as partisan
identification. Party ID is a variable that can be examined over time. In my quantitative
analysis on roll-call vote behavior, Republican Senators will be coded for as 0, and
Democratic Senators will be coded for as 1. I will define my dependent variable (DV) as
voting behavior on public lands policy. Votes against public lands policies will be coded
for as 0, and votes in favor of public lands policies will be coded for as 1. I except to see
an increasingly positive relationship between the IV and the DV over time, meaning that
Democrats will be increasingly more likely than Republicans to vote in favor of public
lands policies.
To ensure the validity of my analysis, I will control for certain variables which have
the potential to influence voting behavior on public lands policies. Aside from political
party, the literature suggests three other primary areas of influence on individual roll-call
votes: the president, constituents, and a member’s personal ideology (Weisberg 1978). I
will operationalize the president by determining whether or not the Senator in question is
of the same or different political party as the president. Senators of a different party will be
coded for as 0, and Senators of the same party will be coded for as 1. My constituency
control variable will be operationalized by the results of the two-party vote in the most
recent presidential election. Range of the two-party vote score is from 0 to 1, and can be
found by dividing the number of votes for the Democratic candidate by the total number
of votes taken for Democrats and Republicans in the election. Lastly, to operationalize
personal ideology, I will use Poole and Rosenthal’s (2007) DW-NOMINATE score. As is
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standard with this score, very liberal personal ideology will be coded for as -1, and very
conservative will be coded for as 1. Controlling for each of these variables allows me to
isolate my IV and determine the effect of partisanship on roll-call votes on public lands
policies.

Testing My Hypotheses
The null hypothesis of H1 is that partisan identification will not have an increasingly
positive effect on public lands voting behavior over time. To reject the null hypothesis and
therefore support H1, I will need to see the party identification coefficient becoming larger
and more significant through time. Specifically, I need to see a p-value of less than 0.05 to
show significance and to disprove the null. By doing so, my study will show that as the
political parties have polarized since the 1970s, votes on public lands policies have also
polarized along party lines.
The null hypothesis of H2 is that constituents and personal ideology will have no
effect on a Republican Senator’s explanations of their votes in favor of public lands policy
today. To reject the null hypothesis and therefore support H2, I will need to see that key
phrases surrounding constituent support and personal connection to public lands are made
in the majority of public statements made by Republican members who break party lines.
By doing so, my study will show that constituent support for and personal connection to
public lands are driving forces that Republican Senators reference when breaking with their
party on public lands roll-call votes.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
Based on the literature review, I expect to see partisan identification become more
predictive over time as to whether or not a Senator will vote for or against public lands
policy. Taking into consideration the general polarization trend between the Democratic
and Republican parties beginning in the 1970s, I predict that Democrats will be
increasingly likely to vote in favor of public lands policies and Republicans will be
decreasingly likely. To test my first hypothesis, H1, I ran a difference of means test for each
Congress to determine the Democratic and Republican mean vote scores over time.
Additionally, I ran a multivariate regression analysis for each Congress to control for other
relevant variables and consider how the relationship between political party and vote score
changes over time. I also predict that for Republican Senators who do vote in favor of
public lands policies today, constituency and personal connection to public lands can
explain said votes. To test my second hypothesis, H2, I performed content analysis of
tweets, press releases, or other public statements made by Republican members concerning
public lands policies.

H1 Results
Difference of Means Test
The difference of means test shows the mean vote score of Democratic and
Republican Senators per Congress. For votes by party, a 0 indicates voting in favor of none
of the public lands policies, and a 1 indicates voting in favor of all 5 of them. As seen in
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Figure 4.1, Republican Senators remained relatively constant through the 1970s and 1980s,
scoring 0.2592 in the 94th Congress, 0.3378 in the 95th, 0.3240 in the 98th, and 0.4078 in
the 101st. The mean Republican vote score then took a sharp drop in the 1990s and early
2000s, scoring 0.1581 in the 102nd Congress, 0.127 in the 105th, and 0.0873 in the 109th. It
jumped significantly back up to 0.34 in the 111th Congress, but immediately dropped back
down to 0.1620 in the 114th and a lowest score of 0.059 in the 115th Congress. Democrats,
too, were relatively constant throughout the 1970s, the 1980s, and the first half of the
1990s. The mean vote scores for Democratic Senators are 0.7644 in the 94th Congress,
0.8632 in the 95th, 0.7615 in the 98th, 0.7311 in the 101st, and 0.6357 in the 102nd. The
Democratic mean then rises sharply to 0.851 in the 105th Congress and remains consistently
high through the 2000s and 2010s. The mean Democratic vote score is 0.9602 in the 109th
Congress, 0.9649 in the 111th, a highest score of 0.9818 in the 114th, and 0.884 in the 115th.
It is important to note that, despite significant changes over time, Republican Senators
always have a lower mean vote score than Democratic Senators, and this difference tends
to grow over time.
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Figure 4.1 – Mean Vote Score by Party Results
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The difference of means test also shows the mean difference between members of
opposite parties. For the mean difference, a 0 indicates no difference between the parties
and a 1 indicates maximum difference. Figure 4.2 shows that the scores in the 1970s were
relatively constant; the mean differences for the two Congresses were 0.50520 for the 94th
and 0.52532 for the 95th, showing little change. In the 1980s the mean difference actually
shrunk, with a score of 0.43746 for the 98th Congress and the smallest mean difference
recorded of 0.32331 for the 101st. The mean difference remained stable in the 102nd
Congress at 0.47757 and then jumped significantly in the second half of the 1990s to
0.7238. The mean difference generally continued to rise through the 2000s and the 2010s,
hitting a high of 0.87295 in the 109th Congress, 0.81978 in the 114th Congress, and 0.8256
in the 115th Congress. Interestingly, it did dip to 0.62491 in the 111th Congress (20092010), but was still significantly higher than decades prior.
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Figure 4.2 – Mean Difference Test Results
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Each of the difference of means tests showed a significance level of less than 0.001,
meaning that the results are statistically significant. The general increase in the mean
difference beginning in the 1990s and continuing to today supports my hypothesis that over
time, Congressional Democrats and Republicans have become polarized on public lands
issues. The mean score by party shows that as polarization occurred, Democratic Senators
voted almost unanimously in favor of public lands policies while their Republican
counterparts largely did not. The mean score by party also offers interesting case studies to
examine, such as the Republican dip in the 102nd Congress, the Democratic uptick in the
105th Congress, and the outlying higher Republican score in the 111th Congress.
Multivariate Regression Analysis
The multivariate regression analysis shows the changes in the partisan
identification coefficient over time while controlling for other potentially relevant
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variables. It allows me to determine whether or not party ID became more significant with
regards to voting for public lands policies over time. The larger the independent variable
coefficient, the more strongly related party ID is to vote score. Additionally, the
significance level at each Congress shows whether or not partisan identification is a
significant factor affecting vote score. Figure 4.3 shows that, similar to the mean difference
test, the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s remain relatively constant. The party ID coefficient
was -0.097 in the 94th Congress, -0.164 in the 95th, 0.059 in the 98th, -0.18 in the 101st, and
-0.091 in the 102nd. For each of these Congresses, the analysis showed a significance level
of greater than 0.05, meaning that partisan identification did not have a significant effect
on public lands vote score. However, as with the mean difference test, an increase begins
starting in the late 1990s. The party ID coefficient rises to 0.263 in the 105th Congress,
0.433 in the 109th, 0.419 in the 114th, and 0.642 in the 115th. Each of these decades has a
significance level of less than 0.05, meaning that partisan identification did have a
significant effect on public lands vote score. Again, just as with the mean difference test,
the 111th Congress is an outlier. In the late 2000s, the party ID coefficient drops back to 0.044, and partisan identification is not significant, as the p-value is 0.776.
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Figure 4.3 – Partisan Identification Coefficient Results
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While the 111th Congress again provides an interesting outlier and potential case
study, the overall patterns indicates that partisan identification becomes increasingly
significant and related to public lands vote score over time. Specifically, the results show
that party ID became a significant factor beginning in the late 1990s. This finding is
consistent with the finding from the mean difference test that the 1990s were the decade in
which Democrats and Republicans began to polarize on public lands votes. In fact, the
multivariate regression findings are even more convincing than those of the mean
difference test given the controls. By including other potentially relevant factors in the
analysis, the multivariate regression shows that partisan identification holds up as a
significant explanation. All of these results show support for my H1: that over time, partisan
identification has become more predictive as to whether or not a member of Congress will
vote for or against public lands policy.
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Investigating the 111th Congress
While my results do show support for my first hypothesis, it is worthwhile to look
further into the outlier that is the 111th Congress. The higher Republican mean vote score,
and therefore the lower mean difference between the two parties, stands out significantly
when compared to the data shown in the Congresses on either side of it. The lower partisan
identification coefficient, too, is not consistent with the 109th and 114th Congresses. When
considering the five votes selected for the 111th Congress, two of these votes immediately
stand out as potential reasons for this difference: Senate Roll-Call Vote 298 on H.R. 2966,
the Interior-Environment Appropriations Bill, and Senate Roll-Call Vote 297, a motion to
table an amendment to H.R. 2966. The Interior-Environment Appropriations Bill allocates
yearly funding for our federal environmental programs, including much of our public lands.
This particular bill increased funding by 16% from the previous year and provided $419
million for the Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF) and Forest Legacy. The
amendment to the bill, which roll-call vote 297 effectively tabled, would have taken the
funding for the LWCF and instead put it towards maintenance and construction projects on
public lands. While backlog maintenance is certainly an important problem facing public
lands, it is not the function of the LWCF, and tabling the amendment kept this important
program alive.
The reason these two bills stood out as ones that were likely more bipartisan is
precisely because of their direct connection to the LWCF. Public lands policies often tend
to be very localized issues, providing funding or land for only one park or one region. The
rest of the country is not usually directly affected by these changes, meaning Senators from
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states across the nation are often less likely to have vested interest in the policies. However,
the LWCF is unique in its reach across the nation. The LWCF has provided funding for
over 29,000 projects in every state and territory of the nation (“State and Local”). There is
not a single Senator whose constituents do not benefit from the funding provided by the
LWCF. In my literature review chapter, I discussed the relevant literature pertaining to rollcall vote choice and the dominant theories as to why members of Congress vote the way
they do. One of these theories has to do with constituents and the effort of members to
please their constituents so as to gain reelection (Mayhew 2004, Fenno 1977). If members
of Congress know that a policy will have direct, positive impacts on the lives of their
constituents, they feel pressure to support it. The LWCF is the epitome of a policy that has
such direct, positive impacts on the lives of constituents in every state across the nation.
This leads me to suspect that bills providing for the LWCF, such as the InteriorEnvironment Appropriations Bill and Senate Roll-Call Vote 297, are much more likely to
gain bipartisan support.
To determine if these two policies were, in fact, the reason for the outlying results
of the 111th Congress, I re-ran both the difference of means test and the multivariate
regression for that Congress with those two policies removed. The results of the tests run
with the three remaining policies in the 111th are very similar to those of the 109th and 114th
Congresses, as would have originally been expected. Without the LWCF policies, the mean
Republican vote score is 0.074 and the mean Democratic vote score is 0.974. Analyzing
the difference of means test, the mean difference between the two parties is now 0.8722,
very similar to the 0.87295 mean difference of the 109th Congress and the 0.81978 mean
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difference of the 114th Congress. The partisan identification coefficient also increases from
-0.044 to 0.566. Below, I compare the original graphs with new graphs where the two
policies pertaining to the LWCF have been removed.
Figure 4.1 vs Figure 4.4
4.4 - Mean Score by Party
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Figure 4.2 vs Figure 4.5
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Figure 4.3 vs Figure 4.6
4.3 - Party ID Coefficient with
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As is evident by the data shown in these graphs, the two policies pertaining to the
LWCF in the 111th Congress had a significant impact on the overall trends. With the LWCF
policies included in the 111th Congress data set, Republicans had their second highest mean
vote score of any Congress and the mean difference between the two parties was lower
than it had been in over fifteen years. Take those two policies out of the data, however, and
the 111th Congress fits right in to the overall trend. The Republican mean vote score is
similar to that of the Congresses before and after it, and the mean difference between the
parties is the second highest of the data. Additionally, the partisan identification coefficient
is 0.566, the second highest of the data, and the p-value is less than 0.001, meaning party
ID is a significant factor affecting public lands vote score.
In an effort to be completely transparent, after analyzing the LWCF votes from the
111th Congress, I returned to the rest of my data to remind myself whether I had selected
policies pertaining to the LWCF in other Congresses. As it turns out, there were two
policies pertaining to the LWCF in the 109th Congress and the 114th Congress, the two on
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either side of the 111th. With the exception of one LWCF policy in the 94th Congress, none
of the rest had any policies pertaining to the LWCF. It is significant that both Congresses
on either side of the 111th also had two LWCF policies each, as these policies clearly did
not have an effect on vote score. While in the 111th Congress the LWCF policies were able
to gain the votes of many Republican Senators, they were not as successful in the 109th and
the 114th. This fact renders my theory that LWCF policies are the sole reason for the higher
Republican vote scores less convincing. While it is clear that the two LWCF policies in the
111th Congress were the two that caused the vote score shift, it cannot be definitively said
that their success occurred simply because they are LWCF policies. There are clearly other
factors at play, be that the presidential administration or the greater context of the bills
themselves. While researching these reasons does not fall within the scope of this
Independent Study, the 111th Congress and LWCF policies provide interesting case studies
for future research.

H2 Results
My second hypothesis gives two potential explanations for how Republicans talk
publicly about breaking from their party and voting in favor of public lands policies: that
the Senator has personal experiences with and connections to public lands, or that the
Senator represents a state in which public lands are of importance to their constituents. To
test H2, I performed content analysis and hand coded for both of these potential factors,
comparing findings from Senators who voted in favor of public lands policies with those
who did not. I coded for the first explanation, personal experiences, with key phrases
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pertaining to childhood trips or personal recreation. The exact words and phrases can be
found in my methods section. I coded for the second explanation, constituency, with key
phrases mentioning public lands or national parks in the Senator’s state. I used the database
Quorum Federal to filter for mentions of public lands and national parks made by Senators.
Within these search results, I then used the aforementioned coding to come up with my
results. To show support for my H2, I needed to see that key phrases surrounding
constituent support and personal connection to public lands were used in the majority of
public statements about public lands made by Republican members who have broken party
lines.
Explanation 1: Personal Ideology/Experiences
In total, I looked at six different comparative case studies. Three of them involved
two Republican Senators from the same state, therefore representing the same constituency,
but with different public lands vote scores. By holding the constituency variable constant,
these case studies were meant to test for the effect personal ideology and experiences have
on public statements about public lands. It is my expectation that when party cannot explain
the public lands vote choice, as with outlying Republicans, it is likely that personal
ideology may have been involved. The three pairs I looked at in this analysis are Senators
John McCain and Jeff Flake from Arizona (40% and 0% vote score, respectively), Senators
Lindsey Graham and Tim Scott from South Carolina (75% and 0%), and Senators Lamar
Alexander and Bob Corker from Tennessee (80% and 20%). The Senators with the high,
and therefore outlying, vote scores are the cases in which I expect to see the effect of
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personal ideology. In an effort to simplify the data, therefore, I have included only the three
Senators with high vote scores in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1 – Content Analysis Results: Personal Experiences
Senator McCain Senator Graham
Total # of mentions 25
0
# that reference lands in 18
0
state
# that reference 0
0
personal recreation

Senator Alexander
49
39
3

General trends from my analysis do not support the explanation that personal
ideology and experiences affect the way Republican Senators with high public lands vote
scores talk about public lands. As seen in Table 4.1, out of the three Senators who had high
public lands vote scores, only Lamar Alexander made any mentions of personal recreation
in national parks, and he only did it 3 times out of his 49 total mentions of national parks
and public lands. One such mention is this section of a press release to constituents, in
which Senator Alexander says “I grew up hiking, hunting and fishing in the Great Smoky
Mountains, a national and Tennessee treasure. Completion of this 16-mile section of the
Foothills Parkway will help the Smokies' more than nine million visitors from around the
world experience the park more easily and have greater access to panoramic views of the
mountains” (Alexander 2016). While Senator Alexander clearly has fond memories of
growing up visiting the Great Smoky Mountains, it is not something he frequently
references when talking publicly about public lands policy. John McCain had 25 total
mentions of national parks and public lands, none of which referenced personal
experiences. Lindsey Graham was an outlier from the other two, with no mentions of either
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public lands or national parks in the 114th Congress time frame at all. The trend of not
mentioning personal experiences in public lands is seen not only among the three Senators
for which this explanation was meant to be, but also for the other three Senators I examined
with high vote scores. In the coming pages, Table 4.2 shows that Senator Ayotte only
mentioned personal experiences in 2 of her 17 mentions, Senator Gardner only mentioned
them in 2 of his 76 mentions, and Senator Burr did not mention them at all. Clearly, based
on this content analysis, personal experiences with public lands and national parks are not
a common talking point for Republican Senators with high public lands vote scores.
Explanation 2: Constituency
The other three case studies I examined involve two Senators from different states,
therefore representing different constituencies, who otherwise have very similar DWNOMINATE scores and yet who voted differently on public lands policies. By holding the
personal ideology variable constant, these case studies were meant to test for the effect of
constituency on public statements about public lands. It is my expectation that if the
personal ideology and experiences which I referenced above are not involved, then
constituency is a likely explanation for roll-call voting behavior. The three pairs I looked
at in this analysis are Senators Kelly Ayotte of New Hampshire and Chuck Grassley of
Iowa (0.351 DW-NOMINATE score and 100% vote score, and 0.346 DW-NOMINATE
score and 0% vote score, respectively), Senators Richard Burr of North Carolina and Bill
Cassidy of Louisiana (0.451 and 60%, and 0.452 and 0%), and Senators Cory Gardner of
Colorado and Richard Shelby of Alabama (0.446 and 80%, and 0.429 and 0%). The
Senators with the high, and therefore outlying, vote scores are the cases in which I expect
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to see the effect of constituency. In an effort to simplify the data, therefore, I have included
only the three Senators with high vote scores in the Table 4.2.
Table 4.2 – Content Analysis Results: Constituency

Total # of mentions
# that reference lands in
state
# that reference personal
recreation

Senator Ayotte
17
7

Senator Burr
21
12

Senator Gardner
76
51

2

0

2

General trends from my analysis support the explanation that constituents affect the
way Republican Senators with high public lands vote scores talk about public lands. Table
4.2 shows that all three of the Senators with high vote scores referenced public lands and
national parks in their state, and did so at relatively high rates. Senator Ayotte mentioned
public lands in New Hampshire in 7 of her 17 total mentions of public lands or national
parks, Senator Burr mentioned lands in North Carolina in 12 of his 21 total mentions, and
Senator Gardner mentioned lands in Colorado in 51 of his 76 total mentions.
These mentions often discuss pride in the state’s beautiful public lands, such as
Senator Burr’s op-ed which states that “preserving North Carolina's precious landmarks
and landscapes is one of the most important promises we can keep for our future” or
Senator Gardner’s Facebook post which says “Great being at the Rocky Mountain National
Park dedication today with local and state leaders celebrating the next 100 years of this
national treasure. Over the past hundred years, the millions of Coloradan, American, and
international visitors to Rocky have been struck by the park's natural beauty, pristine
wildernesses, and its diverse wildlife. Coloradans are committed to preserving and
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protecting Rocky, and making sure its next hundred years are as successful as its last” (Burr
2016, Gardner 2015). Additionally, the trend of mentioning public lands within their state
is seen not only among the three Senators for which this explanation was meant to be, but
also for the other three Senators I examined with high vote scores, with the exception of
Senator Graham not mentioning public lands or national parks at all. Table 4.1 shows that
Senator Alexander mentioned public lands in Tennessee in 39 of his 49 total mentions, and
Senator McCain mentioned lands in Arizona in 18 of his 25 total mentions. Clearly,
constituency has a strong effect on the way that Republican Senators talk publicly about
public lands. By discussing pride in and love for their state’s public lands, Republican
Senators are catering to their constituents, many of whom likely have the same pride and
love. This serves as a way to connect with their constituents over something they all have
in common: the public lands in their home state.
Other Trends
There are several other trends I noticed throughout my content analysis of public
statements made regarding public lands and national parks. One is that, among Senators
with high and low vote scores alike, it is common to mention public lands and national
parks on certain generic occasions, such as the birthday of a specific park of the centennial
celebration of the National Park Service. One such example is this Facebook post from
Senator McCain: “Happy 100th birthday National Park Service - thanks for preserving
Arizona's natural treasures! To celebrate, NPS is offering free admission to all national
parks through August 28th - find a park near you here” (McCain 2015). Almost all twelve
of the Senators referenced these generic occasions, as they are nearly universally
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celebrated. Another trend I saw throughout the Senators with high vote scores specifically
is referencing the Land and Water Conservation Fund. As I discussed earlier in this chapter,
the LWCF provides funding for projects in all 50 states, and is one of the most bipartisan
public lands policies today. It is unsurprising, then, that Republican Senators with higher
vote scores are supporters of the LWCF and its continual funding. Senator Burr,
specifically, has been a long-time proponent of the LWCF, and writes in his op-ed that
“each year in North Carolina, this fund helps local communities preserve land for smallscale parks and ballfields, as well as grander plans like the recent addition of 70 acres to
the Pilot Mountain site” (Burr 2016). Senator Burr and others recognize the value that the
LWCF provides for lands in their own states, and many of their statements concerning
public lands are in support of the LWCF.
Finally, another important result to discuss is the difference between the Senators
with high vote scores and those with low vote scores regarding the sheer amount of
mentions of public lands or national parks. As shown in Table 4.3, generally, Republican
Senators with high vote scores discussed public lands much more often than their
counterparts. Senator Alexander had 49 mentions as opposed to Senator Corker’s 7,
Senator Ayotte had 17 as opposed to Senator Grassley’s 1, Senator Gardner had 76 as
opposed to Senator Shelby’s 1. Senator Burr and Senator Cassidy both had 21 mentions,
but almost all of Senator Cassidy’s mentions can be explained by the fact that he was the
Chairman of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Subcommittee on National Parks.
Simply including this title meant that many of his press releases or other statements
mentioned national parks. As discussed before, Senator Graham surprisingly had 0 total
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mentions, but has hardly outdone by his counterpart, Senator Scott, with 5. The only case
in which the Senator with a low vote score significantly out-mentioned the Senator with
the high vote score was Senator Flake with 33 mentions over Senator McCain’s 25.
However, most of Senator Flake’s mentions are due to his active opposition to public lands
policies. He is one of few members of Congress who campaigns on a platform against
public lands and who is vocal about the reduction of federal land, particularly in his state
of Arizona. So, while his mentions were higher than Senator McCain’s, his active
opposition to public lands policies is not reflective of the general trend of silence on public
lands policies.
Table 4.3 – Content Analysis Results: Total Number of Mentions
McCain
v. Flake
High Vote
Score
Senator #
Mentions
Low Vote
Score
Senator #
Mentions

Graham
v. Scott

Alexander Ayotte v.
v. Corker Grassley

Burr v.
Cassidy

Gardner
v. Shelby

Total

25

0

49

17

21

76

188

33

5

7

1

21

1
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In fact, the generally low number of mentions made by Republican Senators with
low public lands vote scores is an important finding in itself. While it is clear that all of
these Senators are opposed to public lands policies, only Senator Flake finds it necessary
to communicate this opposition with the public. The rest of them simply vote against public
lands policies while not discussing these votes with their constituents. This is likely
because, as mentioned in my literature review chapter, public lands and national parks are
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still overwhelmingly popular amongst the general public. Public lands are an area where
Republican constituents may disagree with the votes of their Senators, so rather than call
attention to this fact, Senators simply do not discuss the issue. It is possible for Republican
Senators not to discuss public lands policy in the first place because it is not a high saliency
issue in politics today, especially when compared to other issues. While Senators may feel
required to comment on their votes on foreign policy, gun control, or health care, public
lands do not receive the same levels of national attention. Republican Senators, therefore,
can continue to vote against public lands policies without having to explain themselves to
their constituents. Unless Republican constituents decide that public lands are an issue
which they will prioritize, and maybe even vote on, it is unlikely that this disconnect will
change in the near future.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
This Independent Study relied on research from political science concerning
Congressional roll-call voting behavior to investigate the roll-call vote decisions of
Senators on public lands policy and how these vote patterns vary by political party.
Specifically, this project asked: What explains Congressional roll-call voting on public
lands policy and how has this changed over time? I established two primary hypotheses in
response to my research question, which I tested through quantitative analysis of roll-call
vote data and hand-coded content analysis of public statements made by members of
Congress.
My first hypothesis, H1, suggests that over time, partisan identification has become
more predictive as to whether or not a member of Congress will vote for or against public
lands policy. A series of difference of means tests and subsequent multivariate regression
analyses demonstrated that, as I had expected, partisan identification has a significant effect
on public lands roll-call vote score and has become increasingly predictive over time of a
Senator’s voting behavior on public lands policy. The results from my analyses provide
support for my first hypothesis.
My second hypothesis, H2, suggests that among Republican members of Congress
today, votes in favor of public lands policies can be explained by constituent support for
public lands or a personal connection to public lands. Content analysis performed on the
public statements of twelve Senators from the 114th Congress demonstrated that while
Senators often consider constituency when speaking publicly about public lands, they
rarely reference personal connection to public lands. These findings provide support for
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the second half of my H2 while rejecting the first half. In this final chapter, I examine and
explain my findings and how they fit into the greater literature. I also discuss the
implications for public lands policy in the future. I end with suggestions for further research
pertaining to public lands policy.

Explaining My Findings
There is an extensive body of literature committed to explanations of roll-call
voting behavior of members of Congress. Amongst the potential explanations, political
party has been thoroughly researched. Ansolabehere et al (2001) discussed that the
influence of party on roll-call voting behavior is strongest on issues which define party
platforms. Size of government is an example of an issue which parties prioritize and which
defines party platforms, and public lands policies are often centered around the federal
versus state government debate. My research shows that political party does in fact have a
significant effect on the roll-call voting behavior of public lands policies, and that
Republican Senators today are highly unlikely to support public lands policies. These
findings fit into the greater literature on the effect of party on roll-call vote choices,
particularly on issues which define party platforms.
The effect of political party on roll-call voting behavior has also increased with
Congressional polarization. Sinclair (2008) states that due to this polarization, an
expectation exists today for Congressional party leaders to pursue partisan advantage. In
an attempt to prevent success by the other side, parties unify around their leadership.
Polarization means there is less flexibility to vote against one’s own party. My research
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contributes to the polarization literature by showing that the Democratic and Republican
parties have polarized on public lands policies over time. Today, Republican Senators
almost unanimously rally around their party leaders to oppose public lands, even if it goes
against the opinions of their constituents or their personal ideology. My results show that
the 1990s is the decade in which this polarization on public lands truly began. This is
reflective of the literature done by Gómez (2000) who documented the contentious nature
of public lands policy in that decade.
In addition to the literature on political party and partisan polarization, my research
also contributes to the literature on the effect of constituency on roll-call vote behavior.
Mayhew (2005) states that because the ultimate goal of members of Congress is to get
reelected, they will prioritize the needs of their constituents. Fenno (1977) discusses the
strategies employed by members of Congress when explaining their roll-call vote choices
to constituents. With each roll-call vote they make, members know that they may be called
upon by their constituency to explain their vote choice, and that their explanation can either
help them win or lose constituent support. Therefore, they keep their constituents’
preferences in mind, ideally voting with the majority of their constituents to prevent having
to explain an unpopular decision. Although my research finds that political party has the
strongest effect on public lands roll-call voting behavior, my content analysis findings
show that constituency is an important factor considered by Republican Senators who vote
in favor of public lands policies today. By discussing pride in and love for their state’s
public lands, Republican Senators are catering to their constituents, many of whom likely

70

have the same pride and love. This Independent Study demonstrates that constituency has
an effect on the way members of Congress talk publicly about public lands policy.
One of the primary strengths of my project is the generalizability of my findings.
Because I performed the quantitative analysis over time and examined ten different
Congresses within the time period, the findings can be assumed to be reflective of the
general trend of roll-call voting behavior on public lands policy. Another strength of my
Independent Study is the combination of quantitative analysis on roll-call votes and content
analysis on public statements. This dual-method approach allows me to consider general
trends while also performing more in-depth analysis into specific case studies. The content
analysis of public statements made by Republican Senators adds dimension to my project
and sheds light on roll-call vote choices of those I studied in my quantitative analysis. A
limitation of my study is simply the time constraints and my inability to do more, both in
my quantitative analysis on roll-call votes and my content analysis. Had I been able to
include more Congresses in my data and more policies per Congress, my H1 results would
have been even more convincing. Specifically, it would have been beneficial to have
studied the House of Representatives in addition to the Senate. Another limitation of my
study with regards to H2 is that although my findings show how Republican Senators talk
about public lands, they cannot definitively show causality. While it is clear that
constituency has an effect on the way public lands policies are considered, this study is not
enough to show that constituency is the reason for the high public lands vote scores.
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Implications
This Independent Study demonstrates the polarization of Congress with regards to
public lands policy today. It has been well documented that polarization between
Democrats and Republicans leads to policy gridlock and fewer policies get passed when
the two parties are unable to agree (Sinclair 2006). The current Congressional polarization
on public lands policy has several important implications, one being that as Congress is
unable to agree on public lands, the president has begun to step in. Over 100 million acres
have been preserved by the president over time using the Antiquities Act (McMannamon
2014). Much of this land has been preserved in recent years by Presidents Clinton and
Obama, results of Congressional polarization and gridlock on the issue. Even more
recently, President Trump has reversed many of these designations, taking steps to
eliminate federal control of Western land. In the future, if Congress remains polarized on
this issue, it can be expected that the president will continue to take an increasingly active
role in public lands management. The political party of the president, therefore, may
determine much of the amount of attention given to public lands in a given year.
Another important implication of the Congressional polarization on public lands
policy is simply that very little pro-public lands policy is passed today. While this gridlock
may seem an obvious finding, it is a significant one. Even as constituents from every state
in the country are out enjoying public lands, their representatives in Washington are unable
to reach consensus on the important policies which will support those very lands. This
disconnect will prove to be increasingly important as climate change continues to threaten
our national parks and public lands. Public lands across the country are faced with melting
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glaciers, rising sea levels, drought and wildfire, and endangered wildlife. These threats are
changing the very nature of our nation’s most beautiful places, those which are meant to
remain untouched by human activity. As these adverse effects become more and more
severe, federal policy will become an increasingly important factor in protecting public
lands. Public lands policy must become a more bipartisan issue in Congress if the necessary
change is to be made.

Further Research
The findings of this Independent Study show that partisan identification has a
significant effect on roll-call voting behavior with regards to public lands policy, and that
this effect has increased over time. Public lands policies, while largely bipartisan amongst
the public, have fallen into the general Congressional polarization trend and become an
issue which members of both parties can rarely agree on. However, there are times in which
public lands policies can gain bipartisan support. The 111th Congress provides one such
case study in which Republicans had overall much higher vote scores than in surrounding
years, and in each Congress since public lands polarization began, there are always a few
Republican votes which go against their party. The success of some public lands policies
over others provides an interesting topic for further research. What is it that makes these
policies more successful? What does it take for Republican members to be willing to
support public lands policies? The answers to these questions are currently unknown, but
merit further consideration.
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Following that line of thinking, policies concerning the Land and Water
Conservation Fund specifically provide their own avenue of further research. While it is
clear that LWCF policies are some of the most bipartisan of any public lands policies, they
only receive widespread support some of the time. What aspects of LWCF policies are able
to garner bipartisan support? What is it about the LWCF policies that do not pass that make
them less desirable for Republican members of Congress? Research into specific LWCF
policies, and their successes and failures, provides another interesting opportunity for
future study.
Lastly, although this Independent Study focuses primarily on the voting behavior
of members of Congress, it also suggests an opportunity for further research regarding
constituents and public lands. It has been well documented that public lands are an
overwhelmingly bipartisan issue amongst the public, and in general, people across the
country see the value in public lands and approve of government management of them.
Specifically concerning conservatives, there is a clear disconnect between the opinions of
voters and the actions of members of Congress. This prompts the question: why don’t
conservative voters hold their representatives accountable on the issues of public lands?
What will it take for conservative voters to prioritize, and potentially even vote on, public
lands issues? A more in-depth look into the beliefs held by conservative Americans with
regards to public lands will help answer these questions which have incredibly important
implications for the future of “America’s Best Idea:” our national parks and public lands.
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Appendix A: Bill Descriptions for H1 Data
Roll Call Votes – 115th Congress
1. Zinke Confirmation for Secretary of the Interior (2017, Senate roll-call vote 75)
A vote against is a pro parks vote
2. Blocking Local Input About Public Lands (2017, Senate roll-call vote 82) which
would revert BLM to old management strategies.
A vote against is a pro parks vote
3. Bernhardt Confirmation for Deputy Secretary of the Interior (2017, Senate rollcall vote 166)
A vote against is a pro parks vote
4. Protecting the Arctic Refuge (2017, Senate roll-call vote 243) which would
prohibit drilling in the refuge.
A vote in favor is a pro parks vote
5. Border Wall Funding (2018, Senate roll-call vote 36) which would impact lands,
wildlife, and waterways on the southern border.
A vote against is a pro parks vote
Roll Call Votes – 114th Congress
1. Limiting the Designation of New National Monuments (Amendment #18 to S. 1,
the Keystone XL Pipeline Approval Act) which would create barriers to
protecting national park sites.
A vote against is a pro parks vote
2. Preserving Natural, Cultural, Historic, and Recreational Heritage (Amendment
#92 to S. 1, the Keystone XL Pipeline Approval Act) which would permanently
reauthorize the LWCF.
A vote in favor is a pro parks vote
3. Selling or Transferring National Park System Land (Amendment #838 to
S.Con.Res 11, the Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Resolution) which would allow for
transfer of any land in NPS that is not a national park, monument, or preserve
from federal to state ownership.
A vote against is a pro parks vote
4. Blocking Designations of New National Monuments (Amendment #3023 to S.
2012, the Energy Policy Modernization Act) which would block the designation
of new national monuments through the Antiquities Act.
A vote against is a pro parks vote
5. Limiting Funding for Land Acquisition Program (Amendment #3210 to S. 2012,
the Energy Policy Modernization Act) which would limit funding through the
LWCF when there are maintenance backlog problems.
A vote against is a pro parks vote
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Roll Call Votes – 111th Congress
1. Public Lands Protection (2009, Senate roll-call vote 1) designated more than 2
million acres of public land as wilderness, established 3 new national park sites,
etc.
A vote in favor is a pro parks vote
2. Environmental Funding (2009, Senate roll-call vote 298) provides funding for
LWCF and other park management.
A vote in favor is a pro parks vote
3. Offshore drilling (2009, Senate roll-call vote 293) tables an amendment which
would reinstate Bush era drilling policies.
A vote in favor is a pro parks vote
4. Land and Water Conservation Fund (2009, Senate roll-call vote 297) tables an
amendment which would take money from the fund and put it towards
construction.
A vote in favor is a pro parks vote
5. Border Fence Construction (2010, Senate roll-call vote 172) allows DHS to wave
all federal, state, and local laws to construct a border wall, disrupting habitats in
public lands.
A vote against is a pro parks vote
Roll Call Votes – 109th Congress
1. Budget for Drilling in Arctic Wildlife Refuge (2005, Senate roll-call vote 52) this
amendment strikes down provision for drilling funding.
A vote in favor is a pro parks vote
2. Budget Reconciliation for Drilling in Arctic Wildlife Refuge (2005, Senate rollcall vote 303) would open the refuge for drilling.
A vote against is a pro parks vote
3. Environmental Funding Cuts (2005, Senate roll-call vote 114) cuts funding to
LWCF and other environmental programs.
A vote against is a pro parks vote
4. Budget for Drilling in Arctic Wildlife Refuge (2006, Senate roll-call vote 74)
A vote against is a pro parks vote
5. Environmental Funding (2006, Senate roll-call vote 60) an amendment restoring
funding for environmental programs such as LWCF and avoiding budget cuts.
A vote in favor is a pro parks vote
Roll Call Votes – 105th Congress
1. Pave the Parks (1997, rider on S.627) a rider which would allow states to build
roads across national parks, wildlife refuges, wilderness areas, etc. Motion to
table an amendment which would remove this rider.
A vote against is a pro parks vote
2. Logging Roads Subsidies (1997, amendment of HR 2107) which would cut
funding to the Forest Service’s logging road construction budget.
A vote in favor is a pro parks vote
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3. Selling Public Lands (1998, amendment to S Con Res 86) keeps public lands as a
funding source for the BLM.
A vote against is a pro parks vote
4. Tax Breaks for Mining on Public Lands (1998, amendment to Fiscal Year 1999)
would redirect revenue from mining on public lands to education. Amendment to
table this amendment.
A vote against is a pro parks vote
5. Blocking Mining Reform (1998, amendment to S.2237) which would update
mining regulations. Amendment to table this amendment and leave delaying
language in tact.
A vote against is a pro parks vote
Roll Call Votes – 102nd Congress
1. Protecting Taxpayers (1991, Amendment to HR 2686) which would impose a one
year moratorium on mining claims in the West’s public lands and national forests.
Motion to table this amendment.
A vote against is a pro parks vote
2. Abuse of Federal Lands (1991, Amendment to Interior Appropriations for FY
1992) which would increase the grazing fee on public lands and broaden use of
grazing fee receipts. Motion to table this amendment.
A vote against is a pro parks vote
3. Montana National Forest Management Act (1992, S.1696) which would release 4
million acres of wilderness area for road construction, logging, mining, and oil
drilling.
A vote against is a pro parks vote
4. Ancient Forests and Endangered Species (1992, amendment to Interior
Appropriations bill) which would allow salvage timber sales in the northern
spotted owl’s habitat. Motion to table this amendment.
A vote in favor is a pro parks vote
5. Grazing Fees (1992, amendment) which would raise grazing fees on public lands
by 25% to $2.40 an hour. Motion to table this amendment.
A vote against is a pro parks vote
Roll Call Votes – 101st Congress
1. National Forests (1989, Senate roll-call vote 145) motion to kill the amendment
below.
A vote against is a pro parks vote
2. National Forests (1989, amendment to FY90 Appropriations, Senate roll-call vote
146) which would reduce funds for Forest Service road building. Money
reallocation to environmental programs.
A vote in favor is a pro parks vote
3. National Forests (1990, Senate roll-call vote 59) which would allow states to
restrict the export of raw logs from public forest lands.
A vote in favor is a pro parks vote
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4. Everglades Protection (1990, amendment by Senators Bradley and Roth, Senate
roll-call vote 166) which would reduce price support for sugar, helping lessen the
pollution and diversion of water supplies caused by the subsidized sugar industry.
Motion to table this amendment.
A vote against is a pro parks vote
5. Energy Conservation (1990, bill by Senator Bryan) which would improve
automobile fuel efficiency, therefore reducing pressure for oil drilling in areas
such as Alaska’s arctic national wildlife refuge. Filibustering involved.
A vote in favor is a pro parks vote
Roll Call Votes – 98th Congress
1. Offshore Oil Leasing (1983, motion to table Johnston amendment to HR 3959)
which would protect a 30-mile buffer zone along Florida’s Gulf Coast from oil
and gas drilling.
A vote in favor is a pro parks vote
2. Selling Coal on Federal Lands (1983, Bumpers amendment to HR 3069) which
would prohibit new coal leasing to give Congress time to look into DOI
management of coal leasing program.
A vote in favor is a pro parks vote
3. Selling Coal on Federal Lands (1983, Bumpers amendment to HR 3363) which
would essentially do the same thing as the vote before.
A vote in favor is a pro parks vote
4. Clark Nomination for Sec of Interior (1983) which would confirm Clark as Watt’s
replacement, someone non-confrontational who nevertheless would not change
Watt’s policies.
A vote against is a pro parks vote
5. Resolution to Reverse Watt’s Policies (1983, motion to table the Johnston
amendment S Res 277) which would advise the president and the new Sec of
Interior to reverse many of Watt’s policies.
A vote against is a pro parks vote
Roll Call Votes – 95th Congress
1. Clean Air Amendments (1977, S252 Stevens amendment, Senate roll-call vote
183) which would allow state governors to permit Class 1, or national park and
wilderness areas, to exceed allowable air pollutions levels for 18 days a year.
A vote against is a pro parks vote
2. Redwood Park Expansion (1978, S1976 Havakawa amendment, Senate roll-call
vote 659) which would get rid of provisions allowing the Sec of Interior to take
over some of the 30,000 acre land bordering the park.
A vote against is a pro parks vote
3. Redwood Park Expansion (1978, S1976 Havakawa amendment, Senate roll-call
vote 658) which would give jurisdiction over compensation for parkland
acquisition to the US court of claims rather than the federal district courts.
A vote against is a pro parks vote
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4. Offshore Oil Drilling (1977, S9 Bartlett amendment, Senate roll-call vote 290)
which would allow oil companies to withhold their interpretations of exploratory
drilling data from the DOI.
A vote against is a pro parks vote
5. Offshore Oil Drilling (1977, S9, Senate roll-call vote 293) which would give Sec
of Interior authority to cancel leases if they posed an environmental threat, impose
strict liability for oil spills, require safest available drilling technology, etc.
A vote in favor is a pro parks vote
Roll Call Votes – 94th Congress
1. Surface Mining and Reclamation Act of 1975 (S.7, McClure amendment, Senate
roll-call vote 57) which would allow the Sec of Ag to remove the ban on surface
mining in national forests if he deemed it in the nation’s interest.
A vote against is a pro parks vote
2. Secretary of the Interior Confirmation (1975, Muskie motion, Senate roll-call vote
219) which would recommit the nomination of Stanley Hathaway, which would
prevent his confirmation.
A vote in favor is a pro parks vote
3. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (1975, S.521, Jackson amendment, Senate
roll-call vote 361) which would create a federally funded program so the Dept of
Interior could contract for exploratory oil drilling, allowing them to assess the
environmental impacts themselves, and helping provide revenue for LWCF.
A vote in favor is a pro parks vote
4. Mining in the National Park System Act (1976, S.2371, Stevens amendment,
Senate roll-call vote 635) which would leave a section of Glacier Bay National
Monument open for mining claims.
A vote against is a pro parks vote
5. Rangelands Improvement Act (1976, S.2555, Cannon amendment, Senate roll-call
vote 771) which would require BLM and Forest Service to provide ranchers with
10 year permits for grazing livestock on federal lands, and a 2-year notice before
the permit could be cancelled.
A vote against is a pro parks vote
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